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ABSTRACT   
We describe recent progress in quantum secured optical networks in the UK. The Cambridge Quantum Network has 
been operating for several years with 3 nodes separated by between 5-10 km of installed fibre. All links are secured by 
QKD systems operating with secure key rates in excess of 1 Mb/s, the highest recorded long term key rates in a deployed 
network. The network operates in the presence of 100Gb/s classical traffic with no significant reduction of secure key 
generation rate. In addition, the Bristol Quantum Network has four nodes 1-3km apart connected in a mesh protected by 
two pairs of QKD systems. The network is designed to be very dynamic, switching both QKD and WDM classical traffic 
to enable rapid reconfiguration and is used as a testbed for QKD protected dynamic applications. The two metropolitan 
networks are being connected by a 410 km QKD link, with 4 spans, the longest of which operates over 129km of fibre 
with an attenuation of 28dB achieving secure key rates of 2.7kb/s, the longest and highest loss QKD field trial to date. A 
120km extension of the UK quantum network from Cambridge to BT Labs, Adastral Park operates with fully 
commercially available components and is an important testbed comprising 3 intermediate nodes and operates with 5 x 
100Gb/s classical channels. This helps determine how to proceed with a large-scale commercial deployment of QKD. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
It is clear that the need to secure network infrastructure is becoming ever more pressing1, and with the advent of ever 
more capable quantum computers2, using Shor’s algorithm3, the long term security of public key cryptography4,5 is 
increasingly in doubt. While quantum resistant algorithms show promise, especially with the work of NIST in securing 
good candidates6, they still rely on computational complexity and have the potential to be compromised in the future. 
Quantum cryptography7–9 brings the capability of robustly securing data transmissions across optical networks, relying 
on the laws of quantum mechanics, rather than computational complexity. This security does come at a cost however, as 
the information in quantum cryptography is carried by a quantum state, frequently by a single photon, which makes 
simultaneous transmission of both quantum keys and classical data challenging. Indeed early quantum networks used an 
additional dark fibre10–14 for the quantum channel, separated from classical data traffic. 
There have been many laboratory demonstrations of point-to-point Quantum secured links in which both the the quantum 
and classical channels are transmitted down the same fibre using both single photon ‘discrete variable’15–20 and coherent 
state ‘continuous variable’21,22 forms of QKD. These point-to-point laboratory experiments have advanced to field 
trials23,24 and then  on to multiple node network demonstrations, both in the laboratory25,26 and field demonstrations27–32. 
It is convenient to summarise QKD link and network demonstrations in table 1. We can see that the Cambridge Quantum 










Table 1. Comparison of QKD link and network trials 












Node number 6 3 9 2 3 
Longest link 
length (loss) 
45km (14.5dB) 14.4km (5.6dB) 85km (18.4dB) 66km (13dB) 10.6km (3.9dB) 
Data multiplexing No No No Yes Yes 
Continuous 
operation 
1 day 600 days 212 days 180 mins 580 days 
Secure key rate 300 kb/s 2.4 kb/s 16.2 kb/s 6 kb/s 2.5 Mb/s 
 
In this paper, we will report on quantum networks in the UK, both metropolitan networks in Cambridge and Bristol and 
also longer distance networks linking them and BT research labs in Ipswich. The geographical layout of these locations 
and the interconnecting QKD links are shown in figure 1. It should be noted that owing to the geography of the UK, 
extremely long and impressive QKD networks such as that between Beijing and Shaghai33 are impractical, so we try to 
incorporate the key elements on a smaller ~500km scale 
 
Figure 1. The UK Quantum network, connecting Cambridge (red circle) with Bristol (blue circle) and BT labs (green circle). 
Credit Google maps. 
 
2. METROPOLITAN QKD NETWORKS 
2.1 Cambridge quantum network 
The Cambridge Quantum Network was initially constructed with three nodes, each separated by between 5.0 and 10.6 
km of standard fibre within the network infrastructure operated by the University of Cambridge. The network connects 
the Electrical Engineering dept., the main Engineering dept. and Toshiba Research Europe’s Cambridge Research Lab, 
as shown in figure 2. Additional nodes are being added to bring additional connectivity to the University’s data centre 
and biomedical campus, but are not reported here. 
The network operates with QKD systems on each leg of the network, this creating a high speed 3 node metropolitan ring 
network. The QKD infrastructure is produced by Toshiba34 with the quantum channel operating at 1550nm. This system 
is capable of producing secure key rates in excess of 3Mb/s, this providing a rapid supply of quantum keys to the ADVA 







network. These classical data systems have been modified so that their AES encryptors accept QKD keys, rather than 
using conventional Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
 
Figure 2. The Cambridge quantum network, connecting the University of Cambridge’s Electrical Engineering building 
(CAPE), Engineering dept (ENGI) and Toshiba Research Europe (TREL). Fibre lengths range from 5.0 to 10.6km, with 
losses between 2.5 and 4.2dB. Credit Dynes et al32. 
Each leg of the network produces its own secure keys, which are consumed by a network key delivery layer32,35 which 
serves keys to applications within the network, such as the 100Gb/s data encryption cards used to secure the classical 
traffic. 
As with all QKD networks carrying classical data, an optimization of the classical channel optical powers is required. 
Most high bandwidth optical transmission systems are designed to operate at powers of the order of 0dBm, but this can 
prove to be problematic for QKD systems which typically operate at powers below -70dBm, as leakage through optical 
filters as well as Raman scattering in the optical fibres can add noise to the quantum channel. These issues can be 
mitigated by a modest reduction of the launch power of the classical data channels. Figure 3 shows a simulation18,32 of 
the effect of classical optical power at the receiver on the Quantum bit error rate (QBER) as well as the pre forward error 
correction (FEC) bit error rate (BER) on the classical channel. It can be seen that operating the classical channel at 
powers of -7dBm has negligible effect on the QBER, while keeping the pre FEC BER better than 10-4. 
 
Figure 3. The effect of received optical power of the high data-rate classical channel on both the pre FEC BER of the 
classical channel and the QBER of the quantum channel. Credit Dynes et al32. 
Successful operation of the quantum network over extended periods of greater than 1 year has been achieved with 2 x 
100Gb/s of traffic on link 2 of figure 2 and also with 100Gb/s on all links, configurations being constrained by the 
availability of 100Gb/s line cards. Typical secure key rates and QBERs for the network are shown in figure 4. It can be 
noted that the long term stability of the network was excellent, with QBERs below 5% and secure key rates in excess of 








Figure 4. QBER, secure key rate and total key volume of 580 days operation of the Cambridge Quantum Network. Data in 
blue represent the CAPE-TREL segment, red the TREL-ENGI and green the ENGI-CAPE segments, as shown in figure 2. 
Credit Dynes et al32. 
2.2 Bristol QKD network 
The Bristol QKD network36, as shown in figure 5a, comprises four nodes at the University of Bristol and locations in the 
city, connected by six fibre pairs which are between 1.2 and 2.7km long forming a mesh network. The primary aim of 
this network is to enable research into dynamically switched software defined networks protected by QKD37,38. In order 
to accomplish this the nodes use two pairs of Clavis 2 QKD systems from ID Quantique. Figure 5b shows that each node 
comprises an optical cross connect, enabling the QKD signal to be re-routed dynamically between paths and wavelength 
division multiplexed optical channels to be arbitrarily routed around the network, coping with fibre breakages or changes 
in demand. 
A  B  
Figure 5a. Bristol QKD network, with four nodes and two pairs of ID Quantique Clavis 2 QKD systems. Figure 5b shows 
schematically the network configuration, including optical cross connects and high bandwidth WDM classical channels. 
Credit Kanellos et al36. 
3. LONG DISTANCE QKD NETWORKS 
The UK Quantum network, part of the EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub39, is designed to encompass and connect 
both the quantum networks in Cambridge and Bristol and further connect to BT Labs at Adastral Park Ipswich. This has 







Adastral Park. The latter is designed to use only commercially available sub-systems, providing a test-network to learn 
the challenges involved in large scale commercial deployments of quantum secured networks. 
3.1 The UK Quantum network between Cambridge and Bristol 
The linking of the two research centres at Cambridge and Bristol is facilitated by the UK National Dark Fibre Facility40 
(NDFF). The 410 km dark fibre link is available on a time-shared basis to connect both sites via a number of 
intermediate locations, some of which are quite widely spaced, providing a challenge for QKD. 
Initial tests on the long haul quantum links were carried out by launching from Cambridge and looping back at the first 
node on the NDFF, 33km away at Duxford. This then provided a 66km round trip field trial over installed fibre with 
17dB attenuation. The field trial over this link was conducted in a similar way to the setup of the Cambridge Quantum 
Network, but with both the QKD transmitter and receivers co-located in the Cambridge Electrical Engineering building. 
Figure 6 shows the configuration of the initial field trial performed on the first part of the NDFF, An ADVA FSP 3000 
shelf comprising two 100Gb/s encrypted line cards (10TCE muxponder cards, with 10 x 10Gbls tributaries and 1 x 
100Gb/s output) is connected to the Toshiba QKD transmitter (blue and green lines). The output from the QKD 
transmitter comprising the classical and quantum channels (orange line) is launched down the 66km of field trial fibre. 
Upon its return the optical signal is injected into the QKD receiver, which outputs the classical wavelengths to the other 
ADVA shelf. Each of the QKD systems inject the distilled secure QKD key to the ADVA shelves, which use them as 
keys for the 100Gb/s AES encrypted transceivers. 
 
Figure 6. shows the configuration of the initial field trial performed on the first part of the  NDFF, with ADVA classical 
transponders and QKD transmitter and receiver co-located in Cambridge, connected by the 66km field trial fibre. 
The physical location for the fibre in the field trial is shown in figure 7a, with typical QBERs and secure key rates 
achieved over the link shown in figure 7b. Over a three-week trial, a QBER of 6.6 ± 0.5% was achieved, with a secure 
key rate of 80 ± 28kb/s. This represents the highest sustained secure key rate for a long distance field trial in the presence 
of classical traffic. 
A B  
Figure 7a shows the layout of the initial field trial, with the 66km loop back from Cambridge to Duxford and back to 
Cambridge. Figure 7b shows both the QBER and secure key rate for this link, in the presence of 200 Gb/s of classical data. 
Credit Dynes et al32 
Successful operation of the mini field–trial paved the way to using the NDFF to connect Cambridge to Bristol. Figure 8 







first link connecting Cambridge to Telehouse (the principal London internet exchange). The first node is bypassed at 
Duxford by connecting the two fibre pairs together producing a single span of 129km, with 28dB of loss. Subsequent 
spans are not as challenging as the distances and losses between nodes are lower. 
 
Figure 8 shows the layout of the UK quantum network between Cambridge and Bristol. The first span is both the longest 
and highest loss at 129km with 28dB loss. The other three spans are lower loss and therefore more straightforward.  
The first span of the UKQN from Cambridge to Telehouse London was deployed in 2019. Optimised QKD systems were 
used, with optical amplification at the receiver for classical discussion and synchronization channels, enabling operation 
with up to 30dB loss. This link (shown in green in figure 8) performed very well with 3 months of continuous operation 
in the period when we were given the fibre. Figure 9a shows the QBER, of 5.0 ± 0.1 % whilst figure 9b shows the sifted 
key rate of 19.4 ± 0.6 kb/s for a sample week’s operation. Figure 10 shows the secure key rate of 2.7 ± 0.3 kb/s, which 
remained stable over the 3 month trial, until the link was surrendered in November 2019.  This is believed to be the 
longest, highest loss single fibre span field trial yet reported. 
A B  
Figure 9a QBER and 9b sifted key rate for the long distance link in the UKQN.  
 
Figure 10 Secure key rate for the long distance link in the UKQN over a period of three months. 
It was anticipated to complete the UKQN, using the other 3 links (shown in blue in figure 8) in 2020. Unfortunately, 
restrictions in research operations off site have been imposed owing to the COVID-19 outbreak in the UK, which prevent 
access to the network locations within the NDFF. At the time of writing it is anticipated that restrictions will be eased 
soon enabling the completion of this link in 2021. All three systems remaining to be deployed have been tested in the 







3.2 The UK Quantum network Telecom extension (UKQNTel) between Cambridge and BT Labs 
In addition to the UKQN from Cambridge to Bristol, another QKD secured link has been deployed between Cambridge 
and BT Labs at Adastral Park, near Ipswich, this is shown for context as the red section in figure 1. This link comprises 
120km of fibre with three intermediate nodes, as shown in figure 11. The purpose of the UKQNTel is to test the ease of 
integration of QKD into real world network and develop use cases and procedures for widespread deployment of QKD 
secured networks in commercial optical networks 
 
Figure 11 Schematic of the layout of the UKQNTel addition to the UK . 
Figure 12 shows the principal design elements of the UKQNTel41 which has an end-to-end classical data path, 
comprising 5 x 100Gb/s data channels in the c band at 1550nm, these classical channels are amplified at each of the 
intermediate nodes. The QKD systems are modified Clavis 3 systems from ID Quantique, with the quantum channel at 
1310nm. At the transmitter node the classical channels are multiplexed and then optimized in power and then combined 
with the signal from the quantum transmitter at the final stage. At each intermediate node the quantum signal is dropped 
first to go immediately to the quantum receiver (this minimizes both optical noise and loss). The classical signal is 
amplified and the power of all non-quantum channels is optimized for onward transmission. At the final stage the next 
quantum transmitter is multiplexed back on to the channel. At the receive end of the link the quantum channel is dropped 
to the quantum receiver and classical channels are amplified and demuxed to their respective transponders.  
 
Figure 12 Schematic of the layout of the UKQNTel addition to the UKQN.  λq :quantum channel 1310nm,  λdis :discussion 
channel 1530nm, λaux :QKD management and key management traffic channel 1529nm, λsup :Adva FSP-3000 supervisory 
channel 1510nm, F2 :Additional narrow bandwidth 1310nm bandpass filter 
Figure 13 shows the long term performance of the UKQNTel with the secure key rates of all of the links within the 
network. It can be seen that the longest link has the lowest secure key rate of 763 b/s was achieved over the 45.6 km 
span, with a loss of 18.8dB at 1310nm. This is the limiting rate for the entire link, as the keys are passed from one end of 
the network to the other using trusted nodes at each intermediate point. These perform an XOR operation between a 
random number produced by a quantum random number generator at the transmitter and with keys derived from each 
span. At each intermediate span the random key generated at the beginning is XOR’d with the received key from the 
incoming span and also XOR’d with the key of the outgoing span. A final XOR operation at the final receiver recovers 








Figure 13 Secure key rates generated by each span within the UKQNTel. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of quantum communication networks within the UK, performing several different roles, yet unified 
by the UK Quantum Communications hub. A metropolitan network in Cambridge has sought to optimize the 
performance of QKD systems in the presence of 100Gb/s classical traffic encrypted with AES using quantum derived 
keys, reaching secure key rates in excess of 1 Mb/s over several years operation. Efficient key management has also 
enabled significant excess key material to be collected and made available for other network applications, such as ultra-
secure one-time pad based transmission. This has proved to be the highest secure key rate field deployed network 
operating successfully for extended times. 
In addition the Bristol quantum network has shown the capabilities of dynamic QKD networks for software defined 
networking and network function virtualization, in particular in the context of rapidly reconfigurable QKD protected 5G 
networks. 
Longer haul networks, such as the 410 km UK Quantum Network from Cambridge to Bristol is nearing completion, 
delayed only by COVID-19 restrictions. The most challenging part of this network has been completed, with a single 
span of 129km and 28dB loss producing secure keys at a rate of 2.7 kb/s of many months. This is the longest and highest 
loss QKD link yet deployed. 
Finally, the UKQNTel extension to the Cambridge Quantum Network, connecting Cambridge and BT labs has shown 
how to deploy commercial QKD equipment together with high data rate classical communications equipment in the 
challenging environment of deployed fibre networks, with nodes within active exchanges. This has proved to be an 
extremely valuable tool for understanding the challenges involved in large-scale commercial deployment of QKD 
secured communications. 
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